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Abstract
How does the economy respond to shocks to expectations? This paper addresses this ques-
tion within a cashless, monetary economy. A competitive economy features producers and con-
sumers/workers with asymmetric information. Only workers observe current productivity and
hence they perfectly anticipate prices, whereas all agents observe a noisy signal about long-run
productivity. Information asymmetries imply that monetary policy and consumers’ expectations
have real effects. Non-fundamental, purely expectational shocks are conventionally thought of as
demand shocks. While this remains a possibility, expectational shocks can also have the charac-
teristics of supply shocks: if positive, they increase output and employment, and lower inflation.
Whether expectational shocks manifest themselves as demand or supply shocks depends on the
monetary policy pursued. Forward-looking policies generate multiple equilibria in which the
role of consumers’ expectations is arbitrary. Optimal policies restore the complete information
equilibrium. They do so by manipulating prices so that producers correctly anticipate their rev-
enue despite their uncertainty about current productivity. I design targets for forward-looking
interest-rate rules which restore the complete information equilibrium for any policy parameters.
Inflation stabilization per se is typically suboptimal as it can at best eliminate uncertainty aris-
ing through prices. This offers a motivation for the Dual Mandate of central banks.
JEL Classification: E32, E52, D82, D83, D84
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical work suggests that shocks to expectations contribute significantly to economic
fluctuations.1 But how so? This is a recurrent question for academics, practitioners, and op-ed
columnists. There is a growing consensus that if, for instance, consumers overstate the economy’s
fundamentals, the economy booms at the cost of inflation. A recent literature has formalized this
idea:2 non-fundamental, purely expectational shocks behave like demand shocks. When positive,
they increase output and employment, and are inflationary. Stabilizing inflation emerges then as a
natural policy recommendation.3
Nevertheless, Figures 1 - 4 show that the US economy was characterized by high cyclical employ-
ment and relatively low inflation in the mid-80s and the second half of the 90s, which are recalled
as periods of exuberant optimism. Notably, Figures 3 and 4 reveal that consumer sentiment and
inflation are negatively correlated.4 An interpretation of expectational shocks as demands shocks
does not seem to fit.
This paper reconsiders the nature of purely expectational shocks within a competitive, mone-
tary, cashless economy where producers and consumers/workers have asymmetric information about
fundamentals and inflation (prices). I show that expectational shocks can have implications for the
business cycle associated with supply shocks: when positive, they increase output and employment,
and they lower inflation, which is incompatible with the Phillips curve.5 Nonetheless, the possibility
that expectational shocks manifest themselves as demand shocks remains. The underlying forces
are producers’ expectations which push toward a supply-shock interpretation and consumers’ expec-
tations which push toward a demand-shock interpretation; which one (demand or supply) prevails
depends on the monetary policy pursued.
A natural question that emerges concerns the role of the monetary authority and its optimal
response to shocks. With flexible prices, producers’ incomplete information is the only source of
inefficiency. Asymmetric, as opposed to incomplete but symmetric, information about inflation
(prices) implies that monetary policy has real effects. Optimal policies restore the complete infor-
1 Empirical studies on the contribution of changes in expectations to business cycle fluctuations include Beaudry
and Portier (2006), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008), Blanchard et al. (2009)), Beaudry and Lucke (2010) and Barsky
and Sims (2011a,b).
2See for example Blanchard (2009), Angeletos and La’O (2009), and especially Lorenzoni (2009, 2011).
3See the baseline case in Lorenzoni (2009).
4 At a quarterly basis (Figure 3), the correlation of consumer sentiment and inflation is −0.53 . Data are described
in Appendix B.
5 Gali (1992) considers the textbook IS-LM model coupled with a Phillips curve and explores the effects of demand
and supply shocks on the US business cycle. A discussion of the Phillips curve can be found in Mankiw (2001).
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mation equilibrium. Inflation stabilization per se is typically suboptimal as it at best eliminates
uncertainty arising through inflation without removing producers’ incomplete information. Opti-
mal policies manipulate inflation so that producers correctly anticipate their revenue despite their
uncertainty about productivity. Bearing this in mind, I design targets for forward-looking policies
which restore the complete information equilibrium for any chosen policy parameters.
A competitive (neoclassical) economy features two representative agents, a consumer/worker
and a producer, and a monetary authority. The worker supplies labor to a firm, managed by
the producer, which produces a single commodity. Productivity consists of a permanent and a
temporary component. There is asymmetric information about its current realization: it is specific
and known to the worker, while the producer faces uncertainty about it. The monetary authority sets
the riskless short-term nominal interest rate. I consider two interest-rate rules: a “contemporaneous”
one and a forward-looking one.
Each period is split into two stages: In the first stage, the worker realizes his current productivity
-not its individual components- , both agents observe a noisy public signal about the permanent
(equivalently, long-run) productivity component, and the labor market opens (and closes). In the
second stage, with production predetermined from stage 1 , the commodity and the nominal bond
markets open (and close) and all payments materialize. Prices are flexible in all markets and agents
are price-takers.
The nominal wage, announced in stage 1, reflects the producer’s expectations about productivity
as well as stage 2 inflation (or prices). With constant returns to scale, the scale of production is
pinned down by labor supply. The worker has complete information, so his labor decision and,
consequently, production depend on the nominal wage and the inflation he knows will prevail in
stage 2.
Inflation, in turn, depends on current productivity, on the producer’s expectations about it,
and the consumer’s expectations about long-run productivity in a way decided by monetary policy.
Asymmetric information about current productivity leads agents to form heterogeneous expectations
about the inflation to prevail; this opens the door to monetary policy. Further, to the extent that
inflation depends on the consumer’s expectations about long-run productivity, the producer needs
to second-guess the consumer. Then the consumer’s expectations also have real effects, indirectly,
through inflation. Therefore, that inflation is realized after the labor market has cleared not only
prevents productivity from being revealed, but, in combination with asymmetric information, it
implies that monetary policy and the consumer’s expectations have real effects.
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Purely expectational shocks affect both agents’ expectations. The consumer’s expectations
about long-run productivity push toward a demand shock interpretation. A consumption smooth-
ing motive is behind this. Consider, for instance, positive purely expectational shocks. A consumer
overly optimistic about the long-run prospects of the economy raises his current demand. If the pro-
ducer had complete information about current productivity, flexible prices would increase and wages
would proportionally adjust leaving the real wage intact. However, under incomplete information,
the producer overestimates the inflationary pressure caused due to the consumer’s expectations. As
a result, the nominal wage increases more than proportionally and a higher real wage prevails. This
induces the worker to increase his labor supply and production to expand.
The producer’s expectations about current productivity per se point toward a supply shock in-
terpretation. A higher real wage reflects the producer’s overly optimistic expectations; employment
increases, production expands and, for a certain demand level, prices need to fall for the commodity
market to clear.
It should not perhaps come as a surprise that the producer’s incomplete information manifests
itself as a distortion in the labor wedge originating from the labor demand side. The labor wedge is
defined as the ratio of the marginal product of labor to the marginal rate of substitution of leisure
for consumption.6 Chari et al. (2007) find that it is countercyclical and accounts for more than half
of the US output variance. When the real wage exceeds the marginal product of labor, the labor
wedge falls. Positive expectational shocks, then, induce a countercyclical labor wedge.7
Whether expectational shocks cause an inflationary or a deflationary pressure depends on the
monetary policy pursued. Taking into account that employment and output both increase (positive
co-movement), it follows that it is up to the monetary authority whether a demand or a supply
shock interpretation best fits expectational shocks.
In particular, the policy weight on the current output gap is central to which interpretation
prevails. To see this, fix the real interest rate and note that, for a “contemporaneous” rule, expected
inflation is zero, which implies that the real interest rate coincides with the nominal one. The
nominal interest rate targets inflation and the output gap. A positive expectational shock results in
a positive output gap. A higher weight on the output gap implies less inflationary pressure which,
in fact, may turn to a deflationary one.
6See for example Hall (1997), Chari et al. (2007) and Shimer (2009).
7 Related papers generating a countercyclical labor wedge in response to expectational shocks include Angeletos
and La’O (2009), La’O (2010) and Venkateswaran (2011). Unlike these papers, the present paper emphasizes the
connection of monetary policy with the labor wedge.
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Turning to productivity shocks, agents’ expectations underreact in response to positive produc-
tivity shocks. As a result, a lower real wage prevails which induces employment to fall,8 whereas
output increases, however by less than under complete information. Following the same line of
thought as above, the policy weight on current output gap determines whether productivity shocks
are inflationary or disinflationary. Of course, agents learn over time and their expectations eventu-
ally converge to the underlying productivity level.
Considering forward-looking policies, the main difference with “contemporaneous” ones is that
forward-looking policies generate a continuum of equilibria for any choice of policy parameters.9
Importantly, what distinguishes equilibria is the role of the consumer’s expectations which is ar-
bitrarily specified. Furthermore, the short-run volatility of output due to expectational shocks is
considerably higher under forward-looking policies than under “contemporaneous” ones. These
results can contribute to the discussion about the desirability of forward-looking policies.10
The nominal implications for forward-looking rules also differ, even after controlling for the
consumer’s expectations. This is because “contemporaneous” interest-rate rules pin down infla-
tion, whereas forward-looking ones pin down price levels. To see this, consider a positive purely
expectational shock and let prices depend positively on the producer’s expectations, which is true
for “active” policies, i.e. policies in which the monetary authority responds to inflation more than
one-to-one. Price levels exhibit a non-monotonic pattern in response to expectational shocks: they
increase on impact, however as agents update their beliefs over time, they gradually return to
their long-run level. Thus, positive expectational shocks cause an inflationary pressure on impact
and a deflationary one from the following period onwards. By the same logic, positive permanent
productivity shocks are inflationary, until prices reach their higher steady-state level.
The producer’s incomplete information is the only source of inefficiency. Optimal monetary poli-
cies restore then the complete information equilibrium. To do so they manipulate inflation (prices)
so that the producer correctly anticipates his stage-2 revenue, even though still uncertain about
current productivity. Inflation stabilization per se is typically suboptimal as it at best eliminates
8 In the business cycle literature, Gali (1999) and Basu et al. (2006) also argue that positive technology shocks
cause a temporary fall in employment.
9As my focus is on the effects of purely expectational shocks as well as those of productivity shocks, I do not
discuss determinacy in the sense, for example, of Clarida et al. (2000) or Bullard and Mitra (2002) (although that
discussion has been recently revived with Cochrane (2011)) . Nevertheless, it is important to mention that there is
no real indeterminacy here, since possible “sunspot” shocks lie outside the information sets of both agents thereby
having no real effects, a point on which I elaborate below. I resume this discussion in fn. 52 .
10 Clarida et al. (1999, 2000) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003) also consider forward-looking policies, however
in different settings. The Bank of England is suggested to follow a forward-looking policy (Nelson (2000) provides an
account of the period 1992 - 1997) .
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the indirect, inflation, channel of expectations without removing the producer’s uncertainty about
current fundamentals. I design forward-looking interest-rate rules which restore the complete infor-
mation equilibrium. The rules “punish” deviations of expected inflation and expected growth from
targets which adjust to their complete information levels.
In an extension, I consider a forward-looking monetary authority with superior information and
let it communicate its information with noise. The noise could be thought of as a measurement error
or a monetary policy shock. The nominal interest rate serves then as an endogenous public signal.
To the extent that prices depend positively on productivity, I show that positive measurement
errors and monetary policy shocks raise the producer’s expectations about the following period’s
productivity which results in higher prices and output.
Related literature. The idea that changes in expectations affect the business cycle has its origins
at least in Pigou (1926) and has recently been revived by Beaudry and Portier (2004).11 Christiano
et al. (2010) show that expectational shocks are disinflationary in a New-Keynesian framework.12
However, this strand of literature distinguishes between shocks to current and future productivity,
whereas I emphasize the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental shocks to expecta-
tions.
This paper lies in the literature following Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972) which has formalized
the idea that incomplete information can open the door to non-neutralities of non-fundamental
factors.13 The closest paper is Lorenzoni (2009). Lorenzoni (2009) restricts attention to the con-
sumer side within a New-Keynesian framework and suggests that purely expectational shocks cause
effects associated with demand shocks. Instead, I consider both the producer and the consumer
side in a competitive economy with flexible prices14 and suggest that purely expectational shocks
can behave like supply or demand shocks depending on the monetary policy pursued. To the best
of my knowledge, this paper is the first to suggest so.
This paper shares with Weiss (1980), King (1982) and Lorenzoni (2010) the idea that monetary
11See also Beaudry and Portier (2006, 2007) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).
12It has also been suggested in the empirical work of Barsky and Sims (2011b).
13 Polemarchakis and Weiss (1977), Weiss (1980), King (1982), Bulow and Polemarchakis (1983) and, especially,
Grossman and Weiss (1982) are related papers of the early literature. The literature has been revived with Woodford
(2001), Morris and Shin (2002), Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Sims (2003). Hellwig (2008), Mankiw and Reis (2010),
Lorenzoni (2011) and Chapter 9 in Veldkamp (2011) offer excellent surveys of the literature.
14 A strand of literature, which for instance includes Angeletos and La’O (2009), Angeletos and La’O (2011a) and
La’O (2010), also considers both sides however within non-monetary “Lucas-islands” frameworks featuring Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition. This strand of literature emphasizes the link between dispersed information and
strategic complementarities across islands which I abstract from.
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policy is non-neutral when there is asymmetric information about variables the monetary authority
will respond to.15 Crucially, it is asymmetric, rather than incomplete but symmetric, information
that breaks the policy irrelevance, proposed in Sargent and Wallace (1975, 1976). Furthermore, the
proposed optimal policies here differ from the one in Weiss (1980). In Weiss (1980), prices perfectly
reveal the unknown fundamentals, while here prices are observed with a delay, so, by construction,
this possibility is non-existent.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the model. Section 4 considers
a “contemporaneous” interest-rate rule and shows that purely expectational shocks can have the
features of demand or supply shocks for different policy specifications. Section 5 presents and
analyzes the equilibria when a forward-looking interest-rate rule is followed and, in an extension,
endows the monetary authority with superior information. Section 6 discusses the role of monetary
policy and proposes optimal policies. Section 7 concludes.
2 Environment
The competitive economy features two agents: a representative consumer/worker supplying labor
to a representative firm he owns and a producer managing the firm. The firm produces a non-
storable commodity. The economy is cashless and the only relevant financial market is a nominal
bond market; a monetary authority sets the price of a riskless short-term nominal bond according
to a “Taylor-type” rule.16 Agents are price-takers in all markets. Time is discrete and infinite
commencing in period 0. Each period comprises two stages: in stage 1 only the labor market opens,
whereas in stage 2 the commodity and the nominal bond markets open.
The consumer’s preferences are given by
Ec0
∞∑
t=0
βt U(Ct, Nt) , (1)
with period-t utility
U(Ct, Nt) = logCt − 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζt . (2)
Ct and Nt denote consumption and employment in period t, respectively, and ζ > 0 denotes
the inverse of the constant marginal utility of wealth (“Frisch”) elasticity of labor supply. The
consumer’s time preference is parametrized by β ∈ (0, 1) .
15 Recent papers studying monetary policy in environments with informational frictions include Adam (2007),
Paciello and Wiederholt (2011) and Angeletos and La’O (2011b).
16Chapter in Woodford (2003) provides a treatment of cashless monetary economies.
6
The consumer faces a sequence of budget constraints given by
PtCt + QtBt+1 = Bt + WtNt + Πt , (3)
where Qt and Bt+1 denote the price and holdings of nominal bonds maturing in t+ 1 , respectively,
Pt and Wt the commodity price and the nominal wage in t, respectively, and Πt the firm’s profits
that accrue to the consumer.
The firm’s technology is
Yt = AtNt , (4)
where At denotes the worker’s productivity.
Productivity consists of a permanent and a temporary component (henceforth lowercase letters
will denote natural logarithms),
at = xt + ut , (5)
where x and u denote the permanent and temporary components, respectively. Productivity - not
its components - is specific and known to the worker, whereas the producer faces uncertainty about
it.17
The permanent component xt follows a random walk stochastic process
xt = xt−1 + t , (6)
where t is an i.i.d shock and  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) . The temporary component ut is i.i.d. and u ∼ N(0, σ2u) .
All agents have costless access to a public signal about the permanent productivity component
st = xt + et , (7)
where et is i.i.d. and e ∼ N(0, σ2e) . Shocks u ,  , and e are mutually independent. Hereafter, I will
call e a purely expectational shock.
The distinction between permanent and temporary productivity introduces persistence in the
shock effects.
17 It may be argued that it is in the worker’s best interest to reveal his type as he is the firm’s owner. This is
only an abstraction. Although I have not explored this possibility, an economy with many islands and complete
financial markets which preserves the asymmetry of information within an island would presumably generate similar
implications.
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2.1 Timing
Each period is divided into two stages. In stage 1, the consumer realizes his temporal productivity
at , agents and the monetary authority observe the public signal st about the permanent productivity
component, and the labor market opens (and closes).
Let me note at this point that I split stage 1 into two sub-stages, although I will not make a
distinction between these hereafter: in the first sub-stage of stage 1 , after the new information is
realized, the nominal wage is announced which, due to constant returns to scale, is independent of
the labor submitted. The producer decides whether to “accept” it if it solves his problem, in which
case he commits to accommodate any labor supply, or not. With the equilibrium nominal wage
announced in sub-stage 1 , in sub-stage 2 of stage 1 the worker decides on his labor supply and,
since -as I argue below- he has complete information, his consumption and bond holdings.
In stage 2 , with production predetermined from stage 1 (sub-stage 2) , the commodity and the
nominal-bond markets open (and close). I specify the role of the monetary authority in the following
section. All payments materialize in stage 2 and are perfectly enforceable.
3 Towards Equilibria
The producer’s labor demand in stage 1 maximizes the firm’s expected profits, Ept [λt Πt | Ipt,1] ,
conditional on the producer’s information set in stage 1, Ipt,1 .
18 Taking into account the firm’s
technology (4) , period-t profits are given by Πt = (PtAt −Wt)Nt . Profits are evaluated according
to the consumer/owner’s period-t Lagrange multiplier, λt . Constant returns to scale imply that
the producer accommodates any labor supply at the following wage:19
Wt =
Ept [λtPtAt]
Ept [λt]
. (8)
The consumer has complete information about the state of the economy and, as a result, makes
all decisions in stage 1. He chooses consumption, labor supply, and bond holdings to maximize his
expected utility (1) - (2) subject to his sequence of budget constraints (3) and a usual no-Ponzi-
scheme constraint. Nominal bonds are in zero net supply, hence market clearing in the nominal
18Henceforth, the producer’s expectations will always refer to his expectations as of stage 1 unless otherwise stated.
19 It is central in the paper that the nominal wage prevailing in stage 1 be such that the producer’s expected
evaluated profits are zero. Given the linear technology (4) , at that nominal wage the producer is willing to hire any
labor supplied which will typically result in a production level not desirable ex-post : once the state of the economy is
realized, the real wage will typically be higher or lower than productivity, yielding losses or profits, respectively, with
profits (losses) added (subtracted) in a lump-sum fashion to (from) the consumer/owner’s income. Even though, the
nominal wage can be set flexibly, this specification could be roughly interpreted as a form of nominal wage stickiness.
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bond market requires Bt+1 = 0 for all t. As such, I suppress bond holdings from the state of the
economy. The consumer’s optimality conditions are20
N ζt =
Wt
PtCt
(9)
Ct =
Qt
βPt
Ect [Pt+1Ct+1] , (10)
where Ect [·] refers to the consumer’s expectations conditional on his information set Ict .
3.1 Linear equilibria
I focus on linear equilibria.21 All equilibria are rational expectations equilibria. In log-linear form
the optimality equations are22
wt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pt] (11)
ζnt = wt − pt − ct (12)
ct = − log β + logQt + Ect [ct+1 + pit+1] . (13)
Combining (11) and (12) results in
ζnt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pt] − pt − ct . (14)
I use the optimality conditions (13) and (14) in the rest of the analysis.
The existence of a monetary policy rule can get round the equilibrium indeteterminacy, nominal
or real depending on whether agents have complete information or not, that would have prevailed
in its absence. However, as Section 5 illustrates, the presence of a monetary authority per se need
not be enough.
20Appendix A.1 provides the equilibrium definition and offers an analytical demonstration of the agents’ problems.
21I ignore whether non-linear equilibria exist.
22Where applicable, approximations are first-order around the stochastic steady state to be characterized in Section
4.4 .
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Monetary authority. The monetary authority sets the gross nominal interest rate (equivalently,
the inverse of the logarithm of the nominal bond price) , it = − logQt , according to an interest-rate
rule. Two commonly used rules will be considered in sequence, a contemporaneously-looking one
(henceforth, rule 1) and a forward-looking one (henceforth, rule 2) :23
it = − log β + φpi pit + φy (yt − at) (Rule 1)
it = − log β + φpi Emt [pit+1] . (Rule 2)
where it denotes the nominal interest rate and pit denotes inflation in period t, defined as pit :=
pt − pt−1 . In the case of rule 1, the monetary authority targets the output gap defined as the
deviation of output from its complete information counterpart at . I restrict attention to positive
values of the policy weights, φpi and φy .
The monetary authority’s information is solely based on the sequence of public signals as well as
information extraction from prices and quantities. In Section 5.5, I let it be endowed with superior
information when it follows rule 2 and subsequently study the information extraction problem of
the agents. I consider more rules in Section 6 which explicitly studies the optimal monetary policies
in the current framework.
3.2 Expectations and the state of the economy
The state of the economy as of period t coincides with the the entire history Ψt = {(aτ )tτ=0 , (sτ )tτ=0} .
Past realizations of productivity and the public signal are part of the current state due to the agents’
formation of expectations. In particular, the evolution of the agents’ expectations about perma-
nent productivity is given by the Kalman filter algorithm. This is because inflation (prices) and/or
quantities perfectly reveal productivity in stage 2 of each period. For this reason, the monetary
authority’s information set when it steps in, Imt , coincides with the state. It follows then that
Imt = I
p
t,2 = I
c
t = Ψt . The producer’s expectation about current productivity as of stage 1 coin-
cides with his expectation about its permanent component which follows from (5) and the fact that
his information set in stage 1 , which I show in the next section, is Ipt,1 = {(aτ )t−1τ=0 , (sτ )tτ=0} . More
23 Rule 1 has been suggested by Taylor (1993, 1999) to capture adequately the Fed’s policy during the period
1987 - 1992 . Among other papers, rule 2 is considered in Clarida et al. (1999, 2000) . Nelson (2000) proposes that a
forward-looking rule fits well the Bank of England’s policy in the period 1992 - 1997.
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analytically and bearing (5) in mind, agents and the monetary authority’s expectations evolve as
Ept [at] = E
p
t,1 [xt] = (1− µ)Ept−1,2 [xt−1] + µ st (15)
Ept,2 [xt] = E
c
t [xt] = E
m
t [xt] = (1− k)Ect−1 [xt−1] + k [θ st + (1− θ) at] , (16)
where µ , k , θ depend on the variances σ2 ,σ
2
e ,σ
2
u and are in (0, 1) . Appendix A.2 offers an explicit
treatment of the formation of expectations.
4 Equilibrium under Rule 1: Demand or Supply?
4.1 Complete information benchmark
Consider the case in which the state of the economy is common knowledge. Then, the real side of the
economy is determined irrespectively of the public signal and the pursued monetary policy; we can
confirm that n∗t = 0 and y∗t = at . On the nominal side, conjecture that pit = ϑ1Ect [xt] + ϑ2 at and
then confirm that pi∗t =
1
φpi
(Ect [xt] − at) . The consumer’s expectations about permanent (long-run)
productivity have only nominal effects: a consumption smoothing motive leads to changes in the
consumer’s current demand depending on his expectations about permanent productivity; however,
flexible prices appropriately adjust in stage 2 and the nominal wage proportionally adjusts in stage
1 leaving the real wage intact and preventing the consumer’s expectations from having real effects.
4.2 Incomplete information
Conjecture that
ct = ξ1E
p
t [at] + ξ2 at (C1)
pit = κ1E
p
t [at] + κ2E
c
t [xt] + κ3 at . (C2)
Conjectures (C1) and (C2) imply the state of the economy can be summarized as Ψt =
{Ept [at] , Ect [xt] , at} . This is a direct consequence of the way agents form their expectations, de-
scribed in Section 3.2, which disciplines the treatment of public signals and productivities within the
state. The monetary authority can fully extract the current state by observing the public signal in
stage 1 and inflation in stage 2 (alternatively, production or employment) which by conjecture (C2)
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(respectively, (C1)) perfectly reveals productivity at . In other words, when the monetary authority
steps in at the beginning of stage 2 , it shares the same information set with the consumer. This
applies to the producer in stage 2 as well; that is Imt = I
p
t,2 = I
c
t = Ψt .
Adding and subtracting pt−1 in the labor market optimality condition (14) and combining the
Euler equation (13) with rule 1 implies
ζnt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pit] − pit − ct (17)
ct = − [φpi pit + φy (yt − at)] + Ect [ct+1 + pit+1] , (18)
respectively.
Combining conjectures (C1) and (C2) with the optimality conditions, (17) and (18), and market
clearing (Appendix A.3 collects the derivations) yields
yt = ξ1E
p
t [at] + (1− ξ1) at (19)
pit =
1
φpi
[− (1 + φy) ξ1 Ept [at] + Ect [xt] + [(1 + φy) ξ1 − 1] at] (20)
ξ1 =
φpi − 1 + k (1− θ)
φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) , (21)
where k, θ are parameters associated with the consumer’s learning problem introduced previously
and derived in Appendix A.2 .24
Equation (19) shows that output is a weighted average25 of productivity and the producer’s
expectations about it. The respective weights depend on the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
parametrized by ζ, and the monetary policy parameters φpi , φy .
The presence of φpi , φy in (19) leads to the first key remark: monetary policy is non-neutral.
This is attributed to the heterogeneity of the agents’ expectations in stage 1 about inflation in stage
2 as we can see from (17) . Of course, heterogenous expectations are attributed to the agents’ asym-
metric information about current productivity. Crucially, incomplete yet symmetric information
would imply a neutral monetary policy.
24 Output is non-stationary. Stationarity can be restored by normalizing it with the permanent productivity
component. For instance, in the case of output we could instead use Y st =
Yt
ext
(yst = yt − xt in logs) . However,
throughout the paper I use the non-normalized variables.
25This is a direct consequence of preferences logarithmic in consumption.
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A second key remark is that the consumer’s expectations have real effects despite prices being
flexible. Once again, this is a direct consequence of asymmetric information. To the extent that
inflation depends on the consumer’s expectations, the producer needs to second-guess the consumer
when forming expectations about inflation.26 In particular, as (90) in Appendix A.3 shows,
Ept [E
c
t [xt] ] = E
c
t [xt] + k (1− θ) (Ept [at] − at) .
What matters for the labor decision and hence production -through the inflation channel- is the
wedge between the producer’s and the consumer’s expectations about inflation. Given conjecture
(C2) and the fact that Ect [pit] = pit, it follows that
Ept [pit] − Ect [pit] = Ept [pit] − pit = [κ2 k (1− θ) + κ3] (Ept [at] − at) . (22)
The presence of the parameter κ2 in (22) attests that the consumer’s expectations have real effects.
Importantly, what lies in the common information of the agents (for example, the producer’s
expectations) and what lies outside both agents’ information sets (possibly, non-fundamental shocks
- see fn. 52) has no real effects through the inflation channel.
I will first discuss purely expectational shocks, which operate only through agents’ expectations.
Insulating the analysis from productivity shocks will allow me to focus solely on the “mechanics” of
agents’ expectations. Subsequently I discuss productivity shocks which operate both directly and
through agents’ expectations. Before continuing, let me point out that
κ1 + κ2 + κ3 = 0 (23)
κ1 + κ3 = − 1
φpi
. (24)
Combining (23) and (24) implies κ2 =
1
φpi
> 0 , which we can see in (20) ; the consumer’s
expectations are positively related to inflation, and, consequently, indirectly through inflation pos-
itively related to output. The logic underlying this is a permanent income hypothesis one: if, for
instance, a purely expectational shock leads the consumer to overstate the long-run prospects of
the economy, consumption smoothing results in an increase in current demand which in turn causes
an inflationary pressure. If the producer had complete information, prices would fully absorb the
26One could conjecture that consumption in (C1) also depends directly on the consumer’s expectations only to
verify that, in fact, the consumer’s expectations do not enter equilibrium output directly. This happens because what
matters for the labor decision in stage 1 , and hence the real side of the economy, is productivity and the producer’s
-not the consumer’s- expectations about it as well as about inflation, as (17) attests.
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increased demand in stage 2 and nominal wages would proportionally adjust in stage 1; both would
imply an unaffected real wage and, as a result, the absence of real effects. However, this is not
the case under incomplete information: an overly optimistic producer -the public signal coordinates
agents- overestimates the inflationary pressure. This implies the nominal wage increases more than
proportionally compared to inflation, which results in a higher real wage. The latter causes la-
bor to increase and production to expand, therefore partly accommodating the increased demand.
Purely expectational shocks via the consumer’s expectations push then toward a demand shock
interpretation.
Turning to the producer, we can see from (19) - (21) that his expectations cause output and
inflation to move in opposite directions. In other words, they point toward a supply-shock interpre-
tation.27 A sufficient condition for the producer’s expectations to be positively related to output
and negatively related to inflation is φpi > max {1+φy1+ζ , 1} .28 That is for sufficiently “active” poli-
cies, expectational shocks via the producer’s expectations push toward a co-monotone supply shock
interpretation. As I have already implied, the inefficiency caused due to the producer’s incomplete
information manifests itself as a distortion in the labor optimality condition. In particular, it causes
a shift in labor demand: the overly optimistic, for instance, expectations of the producer will result
in a higher real wage. This induces the worker to increase his labor supply and, as a result, pro-
duction to expand. For a given demand level, this causes a deflationary pressure; prices need to fall
for the commodity market to clear.
Will a demand or a supply shock interpretation prevail for purely expectational shocks?
Suppose that the expectational shock affects the agents’ expectations in the same way.29 Then
it follows that a positive expectational shock lowers inflation as long as κ1 + κ2 < 0 . By (23) and
(24) , this is equivalent to requiring κ3 > 0 . Inspecting (20), we can see that the term κ2 does
not respond to changes in the monetary policy weight on the output gap, φy , whereas κ3 increases
27 As already argued, since the producer second-guesses the consumer when forming expectations about inflation,
the consumer’s expectations matter indirectly as the term κ2 k (1 − θ) in (22) shows. In fact, since κ2 > 0 , this term
only accentuates the supply shock interpretation as (92) in Appendix A.3 shows.
28 For min { 1+φy
1+ζ
, 1 − k (1− θ)} < φpi < max { 1+φy1+ζ , 1 − k (1− θ)} , positive expectational shocks behave like
negative supply shocks: they lower output and raise inflation. For appropriate policy parameters (φpi , φy) , inflation
depends negatively on productivity. Then the indirect, inflation, channel of expectations lowers the total effect of the
producer’s expectations: an overly optimistic producer expects the worker to be more productive than he is, while
inflation lower than it will actually be. For the suggested parameter values, the negative indirect effect outweighs the
positive direct one. As a result, the nominal wage increases by less than inflation, hence, the real wage falls compared
to its complete information counterpart, which induces the worker to decrease his labor supply.
29 That is I assume k θ = µ in the learning problems of the agents. This is a good approximation if the temporary
productivity shock has a high variance relative to the expectational shock, which is consistent with the parametrization
in Table 1 below.
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in it;30 the sign of κ3 depends on how the policy weight on the output gap relates to the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply 1/ζ . In particular, a value of φy greater than or equal to the inverse
Frisch elasticity of labor supply ζ is a sufficient condition for κ3 to be positive and, consequently,
expectational shocks to be negatively related to inflation.31
The picture that emerges is that expectational shocks can exhibit features associated with supply
or demand shocks depending on the monetary policy pursued. The policy weight on the current
output gap is central to how expectational shocks manifest themselves. In particular, as long as φpi >
max {1+φy1+ζ , 1} , a higher weight on the output gap pushes toward a supply shock interpretation.
To provide an intuition for this, first note that (20) implies expected inflation is zero, that is the
nominal and the real interest rate coincide:
rt = it = φpi pit + φy (yt − at) . (25)
Fix for a moment the real interest rate and consider the case of overly optimistic expectations
which implies a positive output gap. Controlling for general equilibrium effects, the higher the
policy weight on the output gap, the lower the inflationary pressure has to be for the real rate to
remain constant.32
However, the real -and, hence, the nominal- interest rate increases in response to a positive
purely expectational shock. This is a consequence of the overreaction of expectations: expected
future output increases by more than current output since the latter is in part disciplined by current
productivity, whose long-run component agents overstate. To what extent or whether this increase
will be translated into higher inflation depends on the weight put on the (positive) output gap.
Turning to productivity shocks, φpi > (1 + φy) max { 11+ζ , k (1−θ)ζ−φy } is a sufficient condition for
them to be positively related to output. On the nominal side, maintaining the assumption that ex-
pectational shocks affect the agents’ expectations in the same way, a direct implication of (23) and
(24) is that productivity and expectational shocks cannot both increase or lower inflation. To con-
nect the results with the previous analysis, consider a positive productivity shock. Under complete
information, inflation would depend positively on the wedge between the consumer’s expectations
and productivity. Following a positive productivity shock the consumer’s expectations underreact;
as a result, demand underreacts as well which implies that prices must fall for the market to clear.
30A sufficient condition for this is that φpi > 1 .
31The term κ3 exhibits discontinuity at φpi (1 + ζ) − 1 . As a result, this is true as long as φy < φpi (1 + ζ) − 1 .
32One may wonder what happens when the policy weight on inflation, φpi , changes. In fact, general equilibrium
effects complicate things considerably as both κ2 and κ3 (alternatively, κ1) depend on φpi. As a result, a similar
reasoning applies only locally and it becomes hard to generalize. Hence, I will abstract from this consideration.
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However, under incomplete information, prices will not fall as much as they would under complete
information, whereas they can even increase. The reason is that the producer’s expectations also
underreact, hence supply underreacts as well.
Along the lines of the above analysis, the weight on the output gap proves to be key as to how
supply responds. Revisiting the real side, the underreaction of the producer’s expectations implies
that the increase in output falls short of the increase in productivity, therefore the output gap is
negative and employment falls. Holding the real and, since they coincide, the nominal interest rate
constant, the higher the weight on the output gap, the lower the nominal interest rate will be, hence
the less the required fall in prices (see also (25)) . However, both the nominal and the real interest
rate fall after a positive productivity shock, a consequence of the underreaction of expectations.
Last, note that for Ept [at] = at the complete information equilibrium prevails.
4.3 Labor wedge
Formalizing the intuition above, the producer’s incomplete information has an impact on his labor
demand and, consequently, distorts the labor optimality condition. This causes fluctuations in the
labor wedge. Following Chari et al. (2007) and Shimer (2009), the labor wedge is defined as the
ratio of the marginal product of labor to the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption
by construction equal to 11−τn,t in the expression below:
−Un,t
Uc,t
= (1− τn,t)MPn,t .
Un,t and Uc,t denote the marginal disutility of labor and marginal utility of consumption, respec-
tively, and MPn,t denotes the marginal product of labor in period t . The above expression becomes
in this case
N
−(1+ζ)
t =
1
1− τn,t .
Under complete information, N∗t = 1 and the labor wedge is equal to 1 . Under incomplete
information this will generally not be the case; switching to logs and using nt = yt − at from the
firm’s technology implies
nt =
φpi − 1 + k (1− θ)
φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) (E
p
t [at] − at) . (26)
For φpi > max {1+φy1+ζ , 1} , employment depends positively on the distance of the producer’s expec-
tations from the underlying productivity. The labor wedge in logs is given by the LHS below:
− log (1− τn,t) = − [φpi − 1 + k (1− θ)] (1 + ζ)
φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) (E
p
t [at] − at) . (27)
16
Maintaining that φpi > max {1+φy1+ζ , 1} , in case Ept [at] > at , the log-labor wedge is negative, and
positive, otherwise. Then purely expectational shocks induce a countercyclical labor wedge. This
is easy to see: a positive, for instance, purely expectational shock raises output whereas it lowers
the labor wedge. This is in line with the documented countercyclicality of the labor wedge (see
for example Chari et al. (2007) and Shimer (2009)) and suggests that purely expectational shocks
can possibly account for it. Interestingly, fluctuations in the labor wedge depend on the monetary
policy pursued. Section 6 elaborates on this.
4.4 Equilibrium dynamics
I deal with this case numerically, even though a closed-form representation of the dynamics can be
obtained along the lines of Section 5.3.4 below. The baseline parametrization is in Table 1. In that
I follow Lorenzoni (2009) and one may check the references therein. The parametrization implies
the Kalman gain terms, µ and k , are 0.22 and 0.23 , respectively, whereas the relative weight the
consumer places on the public signal, θ , is 0.96 . In addition, I initially set the response to the
output gap φy = 0.5 .
33
Before continuing with the impulse response functions, let me point out that the stochastic
steady state is pinned down by the permanent productivity component xt, which by (6) evolves as
a random walk (see also fn. 24). The steady state is typically different from the efficient, complete
information level of the economy which is pinned down by aggregate productivity at. In the analysis
of the impulse response functions below, the economy has already reached its steady-state which,
I assume, coincides with its complete information counterpart before any shocks hit. As such, the
two will remain coincidental after a permanent productivity or an expectational shock and they
will only differ on impact following a temporary productivity shock. In particular, the steady state
is given by a = x and Ep[a] = Ec[x] = x. With no loss of generality, I set x = 0.34 In all
figures, impulse response functions are for one standard deviation shocks. Periods, appearing on
the horizontal axis of the figures, are interpreted as quarters.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to positive purely expectational shocks. As already argued,
as expectations increase, output and employment increase, the labor wedge falls and the interest
rates increase. For the considered parametrization, inflation falls. With no change in the underlying
productivity, all effects die out in the long run and variables return to their steady-state values.
33The monetary policy parameters are based on Taylor (1993) .
34 These imply y = x, n = 0, pi = 0, and r = i = − log β. For ease of exposition, I have suppressed constants,
hence in all figures the nominal and the real interest rate are zero at the steady state.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply ζ 0.5
Monetary policy weight on inflation φpi 1.5
Standard deviation of permanent productivity shock σ 0.0077
Standard deviation of temporary productivity shock σu 0.15
Standard deviation of expectational shock σe 0.03
Figure 6 shows that after a positive permanent productivity shock agents expectations underre-
act. This causes an increase in output, however by less than under complete information, which in
turn causes a fall in employment. As employment falls, the labor wedge increases and is therefore
procyclical. For the considered parametrization, inflation increases, whereas, since expectations
underreact, the nominal and the real interest rate fall. As expectations converge to the underlying
higher productivity level, all variables converge to their steady-state levels.
The impulse responses to a temporary productivity shock (Figure 7) are initially similar to the
ones of a permanent productivity shock and, subsequently, to the ones of an expectational shock.
As argued above, this is because they affect productivity only on impact, whereas from the following
period onwards they serve as purely expectational shocks.
As I have already pointed out, the impulse responses when rule 1 is followed are generally
sensitive to the specification of the monetary policy rule and, in particular, to the policy weight on
the output gap, φy . Consider the case in which the authority does not respond to the output gap,
that is φy = 0 , with all other parameters as in Table 1 . Figures 8 - 10 show the impulse responses to
one standard-deviation positive permanent productivity, expectational, and temporary productivity
shocks, respectively. While everything else remains unchanged, the implications for inflation are
reversed. In particular, positive permanent productivity shocks lower inflation whereas positive
expectational shocks increase inflation. The last results are in line with Lorenzoni (2009). Notably,
unlike in Lorenzoni (2009), they are generated in a perfectly competitive environment where prices
are flexible and the real interest rate can freely adjust.
Juxtaposing figures 5 and 8 illustrates the first main result of the paper: purely expectational
shocks can behave like supply or demand shocks. A natural question is why the current framework
can accommodate both cases. The reasons are, first, the explicit role assigned to the producer’s ex-
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pectations and, second, the presence of asymmetric information between consumers and producers.
Crucially, the latter pushes monetary policy and the consumer’s expectations through the door.35
The producer’s expectations point toward a supply-shock interpretation, whereas the consumer’s
expectations, as in Lorenzoni (2009), point toward a demand-shock interpretation. The monetary
authority decides which one will prevail.
5 Equilibria under Rule 2: Beyond Demand and Supply
5.1 Complete information benchmark
Like before, under incomplete information y∗t = at and n∗t = 0. Conjecture for prices that pt =
ϑ3E
c
t [xt] + ϑ4 at. The Euler equation (13) becomes
Ect [at+1] − at = (φpi − 1) (Ect [pt+1] − pt) . (28)
A family of solutions is given by p∗t =
1
φpi−1 at + ϑ3E
c
t [xt] ; price levels depend arbitrarily on the
consumer’s expectations.
5.2 Incomplete information
Consider the conjectures:36
ct = ξ3E
p
t [at] + ξ4 at (C3)
pt = κ4E
p
t [at] + κ5E
c
t [xt] + κ6 at . (C4)
Conjectures (C3) and (C4) imply the state can sufficiently be described by Ψt = {Ept [at], Ect [xt], at} .
The information sets of the agents and the monetary authority are like before. Since Imt = I
c
t , the
Euler equation (13) becomes
Ect [ct+1] − ct = (φpi − 1) (Ect [pt+1] − pt) . (29)
35It is key that the consumer has complete information about the current state; this enables me to abstract from
wealth effects which are the subject of Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) among other
papers.
36See also fn. 26 on why I do not include Ect [xt] in (C3) .
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Taking familiar steps (see Appendix A.4) yields
ξ3 =
1 + κ6 + k (1− θ)κ5
1 + ζ
(30)
ξ4 = 1 − ξ3 (31)
ξ3 = (φpi − 1)κ4 (32)
κ4 + κ6 =
1
φpi − 1 . (33)
There are 4 equations and 5 unknowns. Equations (30) - (31) follow from the labor market optimality
condition (14) , whereas (32) - (33) follow from the Euler equation (29) . When matching coefficients,
an equation is missing from the latter because the real interest rate is determined irrespectively of
the consumer’s expectations.
Combining (30) - (33) yields
ξ3 =
φpi
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) +
(φpi − 1) k (1− θ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) κ5 . (34)
Prices can be expressed as
pt =
1
φpi − 1 yt + κ5E
c
t [xt] . (35)
As in the case of rule 1 , asymmetric information implies monetary policy and the consumer’s
expectations have real effects as the presence of φpi and κ5, respectively, in (34) attests.
However, a crucial difference with the case of rule 1 is the existence of multiple equilibria each
corresponding to a different value of κ5 . An immediate monetary policy implication is that targeting
expected inflation invites multiple (linear) equilibria, notably for any value φpi in the interest-rate
rule. Interestingly, the role of the consumer’s expectations is arbitrarily specified across equilibria,
which is the second main finding of the paper. As already pointed out, this is because the real
interest rate is independent of the consumer’s expectations. Additionally, rule 2 specifies price
levels as opposed to inflation in the case of rule 1 .
As expected, depending on κ5, expectational and productivity shocks can raise or lower employ-
ment and price levels. Further, equation (34) suggests that short-run output volatility caused by
expectational shocks increases in the absolute value of κ5 .
20
5.3 A baseline equilibrium
To explore the dynamics of the producer’s expectations in the equilibrium under rule 2, I will
suppress the role of the consumer’s expectations. This corresponds to setting κ5 = 0 in (34) and
(35) . It is straightforward to extend the results to equilibria with κ5 6= 0 .
5.3.1 Complete information benchmark
Like before, on the real side complete information implies y∗t = at and n∗t = 0 . A solution for
price levels is p∗t =
1
φpi−1 at .
37
5.3.2 Incomplete information
Setting κ5 = 0 in (34) and (35) pins down the equilibrium given by equations (36) - (37) below:
38
yt =
1
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) (φpi E
p
t [at] + ζ(φpi − 1) at) (36)
pt =
1
φpi − 1 yt . (37)
Like before, equation (36) shows that output is a weighted average (also fn. 25) of productivity
and the producer’s expectations about it. The respective weights depend on the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, parametrized by ζ , and the monetary policy parameter φpi . By (37) , prices are
a monotone transformation of output.39 For an “active” monetary policy (φpi > 1) , output and
prices depend positively on the producer’s expectations about productivity and productivity itself.40
It follows from (36) and (37) that
37 Since Ect [at+1] = E
c
t [xt] 6= at (see also Section 3.2) , the possibility of prices being fixed in equilibrium appears
only as a limit case for φpi → ∞ . It is also a possibility in the special case where σ2e = σ2u = 0 . Constant prices
could also have prevailed (as a unique non-explosive path) if either productivity at evolved as a random walk, or if
the economy was a static one.
38 Conjectures (C3) and (C4) for κ5 = 0 combined with (11) imply wt = (1 + κ4 + κ6)E
p
t [at] ; the nominal wage
perfectly reveals Ept [at] to the consumer and the monetary authority in stage 1 . Hence, if the signal st , instead of
publicly observed, was privately observed by the producer, the nominal wage would generally perfectly communicate
it to the consumer and the monetary authority.
39Output and prices are non-stationary. See also fn. 24 .
40 For 1
1+ζ
< φpi < 1 output depends positively on the producer’s expectations about productivity and negatively
on productivity, whereas for 0 < φpi <
1
1+ζ
it depends negatively on the producer’s expectations and positively
on productivity. The opposite relations are true for price levels. Employment has the same sign as the weight of
expectations in output as (39) below shows.
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pit =
1
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)]
(
φpi (E
p
t [at] − Ept−1 [at−1]) + ζ (φpi − 1) (at − at−1)
)
. (38)
Inflation, by equation (38) , is a weighted average of the change in producer’s expectations and the
change in productivity in the last two periods.
Let me make some remarks. First, each value of φpi is associated with a unique equilibrium;
the equilibrium with constant prices is obtained in the limit as φpi → ∞ . Second, observe that
the optimal monetary policy in the baseline equilibrium under rule 2 is a zero-response to expected
inflation policy, φpi = 0 . In this case, all variables are at their complete information (efficient)
level. I elaborate on this in Section 6 where I further consider an enriched version of rule 2. Last,
note that for Ept [at] = at the complete information equilibrium prevails.
5.3.3 Labor wedge
It follows from (36) and the firm’s technology (4) that
nt =
φpi
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) (E
p
t [at] − at) . (39)
Equation (39) shows that employment depends proportionally on the wedge between the producer’s
expectations about productivity and productivity itself. Taking the same steps as in the case of
rule 1, the labor wedge in logs is given by
− log (1− τn,t) = − φpi(1 + ζ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) (E
p
t [at] − at) . (40)
For φpi >
1
1+ζ , in case E
p
t [at] > at , the log-labor wedge is negative, and positive, otherwise. In
addition, it is decreasing in the monetary policy parameter, φpi
41 and becomes zero for φpi = 0 .
We can once again observe that purely expectational shocks induce a countercyclical labor wedge,
which is in line with the documented countercyclicality of the labor wedge.
5.3.4 Equilibrium dynamics
Turning to the impulse response functions, the signs I report below refer to φpi > 1 ; that is the
monetary authority follows an “active” policy, along the lines of Taylor (1999) .42 Figures 11 - 16
show the impulse response functions to one-standard deviation shocks for the parametrization in
Table 1. Periods are interpreted as quarters.
41Note that there is a discontinuity for φpi =
1
1+ζ
.
42See fn. 40 for the dynamics when φpi < 1 .
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If a unit shock expectational shock, et, arises, the consumer’s expectations in period t+s increase
by (1− k)s k θ . The producer’s expectations increase on impact by µ and in period t+ s for s ≥ 1
by (1− k)s−1 (1− µ) k θ . The impulse response functions are
dyt
det
=
dnt
det
=
φpi µ
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) > 0 (41)
dyt+s
det
=
dnt+s
det
= (1− k)s−1 φpi (1− µ) k θ
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) > 0 , for s ≥ 1 (42)
dpit
det
=
φpi µ
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] > 0 (43)
dpit+1
det
= − φpi [µ − (1− µ) k θ]
(φpi − 1) [φ + ζ(φpi − 1)] (44)
dpit+s
det
= − (1− k)s−2 φpi (1− µ) k
2 θ
(φpi − 1) [φ + ζ(φpi − 1)] < 0 , for s ≥ 2 . (45)
Equations (41) and (42) (also Figure 11) demonstrate the positive co-movement result, already
discussed: output and employment increase in response to a positive expectational shock. The result
is due to the producer overstating the worker’s productivity. In the limit as s → ∞ , expectations
converge to the true level of productivity implying both output and employment return to their
steady-state levels.
A key difference between the equilibrium under rule 1 and the equilibrium under rule 2 is that the
former specifies inflation whereas the latter price levels. In the baseline case considered here, prices
are positively related to the producer’s expectations. Hence, a positive expectational shock causes
an increase in price levels (Figure 12) . However, as agents update their beliefs over time, their
expectations become more aligned with fundamentals and, hence prices return monotonically to
their steady-state level, p = 1φpi−1 x , generating thereby a deflationary pressure as (45) shows from
the following period onwards.43 Put differently, price levels respond non-monotonically to positive
expectational shocks. They are higher compared to their complete information level, yet inflation,
43 Whether there is inflation or disinflation in period t+1 depends on the variances of the shocks. The parametriza-
tion here implies the latter.
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by definition, measures changes in price levels between periods.44All effects vanish as s → ∞ .
To pin down the impulse responses of the nominal and the real interest rate (Figure 12) I need
to specify the impulse response of expected inflation:
dEct [pit+1]
det
=
ζ(φpi − 1) k θ − φpi (µ− k θ)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] (46)
dEct+s [pit+s+1]
det
= (1− k)s−1φpi (µ− k) + [ζ(φpi − 1) (1− k)] k θ
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] , for s ≥ 1 . (47)
The nominal interest rate is it+s = φpi E
c
t+s [pit+s+1] and the real interest rate is rt+s = (φpi −
1)Ect+s [pit+s+1] .
45
Inflation expectations increase,46 given the parametrization, resulting in higher nominal and real
interest rates. In the limit s → ∞ , inflation expectations, the nominal, and the real interest rate
all return to their steady-state values.
If a shock to the permanent productivity component t = 1 arises, the consumer’s expectations
about productivity in period t+s increase by 1 − (1−k)s+1 as (16) implies, whereas the producer’s
expectations increase by 1 − (1− µ) [1− (1− k)s] as (15) implies. The impulse response functions
are
dyt+s
dt
= 1 − (1− k)s φpi (1 − µ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) ∈ (0, 1) (48)
dnt+s
dt
= − (1− k)s φpi (1 − µ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) < 0 (49)
dpit
dt
=
1
φpi − 1
(
1 − φpi (1 − µ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)
)
> 0 (50)
dpit+s
dt
= (1− k)s−1 φpi (1 − µ) k
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] > 0 , for s ≥ 1 . (51)
44A similar result is obtained in Lorenzoni (2005), though not associated with disinflation. The increase in prices
can become less severe and prices can even fall for reasonable values of φpi under an extended forward-looking rule
targeting expected growth in addition to expected inflation. The logic is similar to the rule 1 case: for a given real
interest rate, the greater the weight placed on expected growth, the lower expected inflation will be, controlling for
general equilibrium effects.
45 In addition, notice that Ect [yt+s] = E
c
t [xt] and E
c
t [pit+s] = 0 for s ≥ 1 . These results follow from (36) and
(38) combined with (16) .
46This is unlike the case of rule 1. The difference between the two lies in that rule 1 specifies inflation rather than
price levels.
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A unit increase in the permanent productivity shock causes an equivalent change in steady-state
output and no change in steady-state employment. We can see from (48) and (49) (see also Figure
13) that a positive permanent productivity shock causes output to increase by less than one and
employment to fall temporarily. By (40), the labor wedge increases temporarily. This happens
because expectations underreact after a positive permanent productivity shock. As a result, labor
demand shifts inwards and the real wage falls relative to its efficient level. Equation (51) suggests
productivity shocks are inflationary (see also Figure 14). The positive dependence of prices on
expectations for φpi > 1, as (36) and (37) imply, underlies this result. Hence, as expectations
converge to the new permanent productivity level, prices get closer to their steady-state level,
implying inflation along the way.
The impulse response of the consumer’s inflation expectations (also Figure 14) is
dEct+s [pit+s+1]
dt
= (1− k)s φpi (k − µ) − ζ(φpi − 1) (1− k)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] . (52)
Figure 14 shows that following a permanent productivity shock inflation expectations fall and
so are the nominal and the real interest rate. In the limit as s → ∞ , expectations converge to the
new productivity level, output converges to its new steady state, whereas the remaining variables
return to their pre-shock levels.
A temporary productivity shock causes on impact responses similar to those in the permanent
productivity shock case; from the following period onwards, it only affects the agents’ expectations,
hence the responses resemble the ones in the expectational shock case. The consumer’s expectations
in period t + s increase by (1 − k)s k (1 − θ) , whereas the producer’s expectations are unchanged
on impact, as changes in the temporary productivity component affect their expectations with one-
period lag, and increase by (1− k)s−1 (1− µ) k (1− θ) in period t+ s for s ≥ 1 . In particular, in
period t the responses are
dyt
dut
=
ζ(φpi − 1)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) ∈ (0, 1) (53)
dnt
dut
= − φpi
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) < 0 (54)
dpit
dut
=
ζ
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) > 0 . (55)
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In the subsequent periods the responses are
dyt+s
dut
=
dnt+s
du+t
= (1− k)s−1 φpi (1− µ) k (1− θ)
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) > 0 , for s ≥ 1 (56)
dpit+1
dut
= − ζ (φpi − 1) − φpi (1− µ) k(1− θ)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] (57)
dpit+s
dut
= − (1− k)s−2 φpi (1− µ) k
2 (1− θ)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] < 0 , for s ≥ 2 . (58)
The response of inflation expectations is given by
dEct [pit+1]
dut
=
φpi k (1− θ) − ζ (φpi − 1) [1 − k (1− θ)]
(φpi − 1)[φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] (59)
dEct+s [pit+s+1]
dut
= (1− k)s−1 [φpi (µ− k) + ζ(φ− 1) (1− k)] k (1− θ)
(φpi − 1) [φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] , for s ≥ 1 . (60)
Figures 15 and 16 display the impulse response functions.
5.4 Short-run volatility
In what is a separate exercise, I compare the short-run (one-period) output volatility caused by
purely expectational shocks, et , among the equilibria for the considered interest-rate rules.
47 The
parametrization is the one in Table 1 . I normalize to one the short-run output volatility generated
by rule 1 for φy = 0 to make comparisons easier. Table 2 reports the results.
We can see that the baseline case of rule 2 generates considerably higher short-run output
volatility than the considered cases of rule 1 . This can be further increased by assigning a role to
the consumer’s expectations (see also (34)) . Considering the analyzed equilibria for rule 1 , “supply”
shocks (φy = 0.5) generate considerably higher volatility than “demand” shocks (φy = 0) . Indeed,
for φpi high enough so that φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) > 0 , the short-run output volatility due to
expectational shocks increases in φy .
47Short-run output volatility in the cases of rule 1 and 2, respectively, is
φpi − 1 + k (1− θ)
φpi (1 + ζ) − (1 + φy) µσ
2
e
φpi
φpi + ζ (φpi − 1) µσ
2
e .
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Table 2: Short-run volatility
Rule 1 (φy = 0) 1
Rule 1 (φy = 0.5) 2.78
Rule 2 (baseline) 4.43
5.5 Monetary authority with superior information
In this section I lift the assumption that the monetary authority has no superior information com-
pared to the agents. Instead, I assume that the monetary authority has information about the
following period’s state. To prevent the forward-looking48 nominal interest rate from being fully
revealing about the following period’ state, I require that the monetary authority either reports the
following period’s price with a measurement error or transmits “surprise” monetary policy shocks.
In both cases the nominal interest rate serves as a public signal about the following period’s pro-
ductivity. However, in the former case the monetary authority misreports the following period’s
prices unintentionally, as opposed to intentionally in the latter. The aim of this section is twofold:
first, to analyze the informational implications per se when the monetary authority communicates
its superior information with noise; second, to equip the monetary authority with an additional
monetary policy tool, the monetary policy shocks, and pin down its equilibrium effects. I further
explore monetary policy shocks in Section 6 . The focus throughout this section will be on the base-
line case of rule 2 , which corresponds to setting κ5 = 0 in (34) and (35) . Extending the results to
the other equilibria is straightforward.
When the monetary authority reports the following period’s price with a measurement error,
the prevailing nominal interest rate in t− 1 is
it−1 = φpi p˜it , (61)
where p˜it ≡ p˜t − pt−1 , with
p˜t = pt + wt . (62)
The error term is i.i.d with wt ∼ N(0, σ2w) and is independent of the shocks t, et, and ut .
48 Since agents have complete information about the current state when the monetary authority steps in, there can
only be information extraction if the monetary authority is forward-looking. Therefore, I restrict attention only to
rule 2 .
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In terms of observables as of stage 2 in period t− 1, this can be expressed as
p˜t =
1
φpi
(it−1 + φpi pt−1) .
In the case of monetary policy shocks the nominal interest rate is
it−1 = φpi pit + ωt , (63)
where ω is i.i.d. with ωt ∼ N(0, σ2ω) and is independent of the shocks t, et, ut, and wt .
Agents now extract
pˆt = φpi pt + ωt , (64)
which in terms of observables in stage 2 of period t− 1 can be expressed as
pˆt = it−1 + φpi pt−1 .
5.6 Linear equilibria
Equilibrium is given by equations (36) - (38) . The state of the economy is now augmented by the
public signal about period t’s productivity which the monetary authority transmits. I denote this
by zt in the case of a measurement error and zˆt in the case of a monetary policy shock. The state
can sufficiently be described then by Ωt =
({aτ}tτ=0 , {sτ}tτ=0 , zt) , replacing Ωt with Ωˆt and zt
with zˆt in the case of a monetary policy shock. What distinguishes the two cases is the information
set of the monetary authority; in the case of measurement errors it is Imt = Ωt \ {zt} , whereas
in the case of monetary policy shocks it is Imt = Ωˆt . That is, in the latter case, the monetary
authority takes into account the effects of the signal it transmits. I assume it is common knowledge
what the case is each time a shock hits. As I show in Appendix A.4.1, the endogenous public signals
associated with the two cases are
zt = at +
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)
ζ
wt (65)
zˆt = at +
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)
φpi ζ
ωt . (66)
Agents (perfectly) disentangle the endogenous public signals upon the realization of the public
signal st in stage 1 of period t .
49 The producer’s information set then becomes Ipt,1 = Ωt \ {at} ,
49 This happens because they know the stochastic process of prices given by (37) .
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whereas the consumer’s Ict = Ωt . As I show in Appendix A.4.1, the producer’s expectations about
productivity are
Ept [at | Ipt,1] = δ Ept
[
xt | Ipt,1 \ {zt}
]
+ (1− δ) zt , (67)
where δ is a coefficient in (0, 1) (respectively use δˆ, zˆt and Ωˆt in the case of a monetary policy
shock) . Importantly, δ and δˆ depend on the monetary policy parameter φpi .
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It is apparent from (65) and (66) that the economy’s response to measurement errors and
monetary policy shocks is very similar. In particular, for φpi > 1 positive interest rate shocks raise
the producer’s expectations about productivity in the following period. This happens because for
φpi > 1 prices are positively related to productivity. Therefore, a higher nominal interest rate
overstates the following period’s price and leads the producer to partially attribute it to an increase
in productivity.51
5.7 Equilibrium dynamics
The dynamics when shocks t, et, and ut are realized are very similar to the ones in Section 5.3.4 .
Unlike there, the effects of a measurement error or a monetary policy shock last only one period.
This is because it generates a signal about at, which consumers learn and producers realize once
the labor decision is made . If a shock wt = 1 arises, the impact responses are
dyt
dwt
=
dnt
dwt
=
φpi (1− δ)
ζ
> 0 (68)
dpt
dwt
=
dpit
dwt
= −dpit+1
dwt
=
φpi (1− δ)
ζ (φpi − 1) > 0 . (69)
It can be seen from (68) and (69) that interest rate shocks boost output and prices. These
responses are in the same direction as the ones after a shock to the public signal st . This is because
measurement errors and monetary policy shocks serve as purely expectational shocks: when positive,
50 The case analyzed in Section 3 corresponds to δ = 1 which would prevail if the conditional variance of the
endogenous signals was infinite.
51 In case the monetary authority has no superior information and this is common knowledge, monetary policy
shocks have no real effects because they are unanticipated by both agents, hence they have no effect on the labor
decision in stage 1 . They can immediately be extracted by the agents which implies they have no effect on the
consumer’s inflation and output expectations for the following period. As a result, they only affect the current price,
in a co-monotone way for φpi > 1 . On the contrary, in the superior information case agents extract monetary policy
shocks with one-period lag, hence their nominal effects are realized in the following period. In addition, monetary
policy shocks have real effects since they are not simultaneously fully extracted by both agents.
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they increase the producer’s expectations about productivity without any change in the underlying
fundamentals.
The impact responses to a policy shock ωt = 1 are scaled down by φpi as (66) suggests:
dyt
dωt
=
dnt
dωt
=
(1− δˆ)
ζ
> 0 (70)
dpt
dωt
=
dpit
dωt
= −dpit+1
dωt
=
(1− δˆ)
ζ(φpi − 1) > 0 . (71)
The previous comments apply. However, in the next section I show that the two cases generate
partly different monetary policy implications.
6 Monetary Policy
The equilibrium nominal wage in stage 1 is given by
wt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pt] .
Consequently, through the nominal wage, the real side of the economy reflects the producer’s ex-
pectations about productivity. The producer’s expectations enter the nominal wage both directly
and indirectly through inflation in the case of rule 1 and prices in the case of rule 2 . Monetary
policy can have real effects through the indirect inflation (price) channel. To see this, observe that
the labor market optimality condition (17) can more generally be written
ζnt = E
p
t [at] + E
p
t [pit] − Ect [pit] − Ect [ct] . (72)
Taking the producer’s uncertainty as given, monetary policy has real effects as long as agents form
heterogeneous expectations about the inflation to prevail in stage 2 , that is Ept [pit] 6= Ect [pit] . By
construction, this is the case here. Crucially, what matters for labor decision and, hence the real side,
is the wedge in the agents’s expectations about inflation, Ept [pit] − Ect [pit] . Anything common in
the agents’ information sets and anything lying outside both agents’ information sets (for instance,
non-fundamental shocks - see fn. 52 below) has no real effects through the inflation channel. Then,
it should not perhaps come as a surprise that incomplete yet symmetric information about current
productivity would imply a neutral monetary policy.
The producer’s incomplete information is the only source of inefficiency. Optimal monetary pol-
icy restores then the complete information equilibrium. An infinitely aggressive policy on inflation
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policy implies pit = 0 and only removes the indirect, inflation (price) channel of expectations. As
a result, it is typically suboptimal.
By direct implication of (14) , the complete information equilibrium is restored if and only if
Ept [at] + E
p
t [pit] − (pit + at) = 0 (73)
Ept [at] + E
p
t [pt] − (pt + at) = 0 , (74)
for rules 1 and 2 , respectively.
It follows that monetary policy succeeds, not by removing the producer’s uncertainty, but rather
by making it irrelevant. To see this, note that inflation (prices) depends on productivity and agents’
expectations in a way decided by monetary policy. Optimal monetary policy manipulates inflation
in such a way that the producer correctly anticipates his stage-2 revenue, which is all he is interested
in.
One would argue that the inefficiency here arises exactly because of agents’s asymmetric infor-
mation; if agents had incomplete yet symmetric information, then the complete information equilib-
rium would prevail. However, this is true only because of logarithmic preferences in consumption; in
more general environments, the producer’s incomplete information would suffice. Nevertheless, it is
asymmetric, rather than incomplete but symmetric, information in combination with the existence
of a nominal bond market that enables the monetary authority to drive the economy closer to the
complete information equilibrium. If a real bond market was in the place of the nominal bond
market, then the inflation (price) channel would be absent, and there would be no way to drive the
economy to the first best.
Optimal policy here has different implications from the one in Weiss (1980) which implies that
prices perfectly communicate fundamentals. By construction, this is a nonexistent possibility here.
However, this paper shares with Weiss (1980), King (1982) and Lorenzoni (2010) the insight that,
at the time the labor decision is made, it is asymmetric, as opposed to incomplete but symmetric,
information about variables the monetary policy will be based on that breaks the policy irrelevance
proposed in Sargent and Wallace (1975, 1976) . Implicit in this is that the monetary authority is
more informed when it steps in than the least informed agent (here, the producer) at the time
the labor decision is made. This is true here since the time advantage of the monetary authority
is essentially an informational advantage; in fact, the monetary authority perfectly observes or
extracts the variables in question (inflation, output, current productivity) when it steps in.
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Crucially, that inflation stabilization is suboptimal is in contrast with the baseline case in Loren-
zoni (2009) in which the limit φpi → ∞ restores the efficient equilibrium. In Lorenzoni (2009) ,
producers have complete information, however nominal rigidities prevent prices from fully absorbing
the consumer’s expectations about long-run productivity. Stabilizing inflation resolves this. In con-
trast, here prices flexibly adjust, however producers have incomplete information about productiv-
ity and, consequently, their (stage-2) revenue; stabilizing inflation only eliminates their uncertainty
about inflation but not about their revenue.
Below I consider both interest-rate rules and explore how the monetary authority can mitigate
the effects of incomplete information and drive the economy closer to its complete information
counterpart in each case. In the context of rule 2 , I design policy targets which restore the complete
information equilibrium for any choice of policy parameters.52
6.1 Rule 1
If interest-rate rule 1 is followed, setting φpi = 1 − k (1 − θ) is optimal; however, this policy is
unrealistic as it requires the monetary authority to be fully aware of the agents’ learning problems
which is hardly realistic. Crucially, in the limit as φpi → ∞, pit → 0 ;53 inflation is constant and
the indirect (inflation/price) channel of expectations, through which the consumer’s expectations
also operate, is muted. However, even in this limit case, the producer’s expectations continue to
matter via the direct channel. Hence, inflation stabilization can at best eliminate the uncertainty
arising through the inflation channel and, as such, is suboptimal.
An implication of Section 5.4 is that, for moderate values of φy , short-run output volatility
due to purely expectational shocks increases in φy . However, perhaps not surprisingly, in the limit
φy → ∞ , the economy is at its complete information counterpart; a policy infinitely responsive to
deviations of output from its complete information level is therefore optimal.
52My focus so far has been on the effects of purely expectational shocks as well on those of productivity shocks.
However, a fair question, especially when it comes to monetary policy, is about the possible presence of indeterminacies.
The answer is that here there is no real indeterminacy. To see this, first note that the labor decision is intratemporal
and is anyway made before inflation prevails. Turning to inflation, even if it is indeterminate, i.e. susceptible to
possibly non-fundamental (“sunspot”) shocks, since the “sunspot” shocks lie outside the information sets of both
agents, they cannot affect the labor decision in stage 1 , i.e. they cannot have real effects (see (72) and the analysis
that comes with it) . Nevertheless, there may well be nominal indeterminacy. To rule out “sunspot” shocks in the
case, for instance, of rule 1, on which the positive part of this paper is based , we would need φpi > 1 . But I should
repeat here, that I abstract from such considerations.
53 As φpi increases, the sign of the change in the weight of the producer’s expectations, ξ1 , is given by the sign of
− (1 +φy) + [1 − k (1− θ)] (1 + ζ) (see also (19) and (21)) . It is negative for a high enough φy relative to the inverse
Frisch elasticity ζ , while there is a discontinuity at
1+φy
1+ζ
.
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6.2 Rule 2
A first policy implication generated by the equilibrium analysis (see Section 5) is that a forward-
looking rule, like rule 2 , invites multiple equilibria in which the consumer’s expectations is arbitrarily
specified, which is not the case when a contemporaneously-looking rule is followed.54 Second, as I
showed in Section 5.4 , the short-run volatility of output due to expectational shocks is substantially
higher for forward-looking rules than for contemporaneously-looking ones, for the parametrization
in Table 1 .
I initially consider the baseline equilibrium in which the consumer’s expectations have no role.55
This corresponds to setting κ5 = 0 in (34) . Observe in (36) that the weight of output placed on
producer’s expectations is κ4 =
φpi
φpi + ζ (φpi−1) , whereas the weight placed on productivity is 1 − κ4 .
The former decreases in φpi (see also fn. 41) ; the greater φpi , the weaker the indirect (price) channel
of expectations will be. In the limit as φpi → ∞ , prices are constant. As in the previous case, only
the indirect channel of expectations is muted, therefore inflation stabilization is suboptimal.
The focus so far has been on active policies, which correspond to the monetary authority setting
φpi > 1 . However, setting φpi = 0 in (36) and (37) returns yt = at and pt = − at ; a Friedman-
rule policy completely eliminates the role of expectations and keeps the economy at its complete
information level. To provide an intuition for this, observe that for φpi <
1
1+ζ the price effect
becomes negative, which implies the indirect channel effect mitigates the direct one. For φpi = 0,
the two effects precisely offset each other, rendering, therefore, incomplete information irrelevant in
equilibrium. Notably, such a policy implies that the producer’s revenue is constant across states:
high prices prevail for low productivities and vice versa. Summarizing the above, the Friedman rule,
for different from the usual reasons, emerges as an optimal policy; however, if an active policy is to
be pursued, then it should be as aggressive on inflation as possible.
Next, I analyze monetary policy when the monetary authority has superior information. As we
saw earlier, the monetary authority can either, unintentionally, report prices with a measurement
error or, intentionally, fuel the economy with “surprise” monetary policy shocks. A straightforward
option for a “benevolent” monetary authority in the latter case is to use monetary policy shocks to
eliminate the producer’s expectational errors. However, I will focus on the monetary policy param-
eters that can insulate the economy against measurement errors and can serve as a commitment
device against monetary policy shocks.
54At least, I have failed to find other linear equilibria for rule 1 .
55See fn. 58 below for the general case.
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One can see from (68) and (70) and Appendix A.4.1 that the monetary policy parameter φpi
affects the equilibrium not only directly, but also indirectly by affecting the precision of the endoge-
nous public signal, zt or zˆt , it generates. The precision of the public signal is inversely related to δ
(δˆ for the monetary policy shock) .
Considering the case where the authority reports prices with a measurement error, in the limit
as φpi → ∞ , the precision of the endogenous public signal zt becomes zero and δ → 1 ; hence,
agents ignore the public signal which then has no real effects. Alternatively, a Friedman-rule policy
ensures immunity to measurement errors as well, for the reasons outlined above. Hence, both
extreme policies imply measurement errors have no real effects.
In the case of monetary policy shocks, φpi matters only through the parameter δˆ as we can see
from (70) . Appendix A.4.1 shows that the variance of the signal zˆt tends to infinity only when
a Friedman-rule policy is pursued, which is the unique optimal policy in this case allowing the
monetary authority to commit against “surprise” shocks. Even though, for φpi > 1 (a sufficient
condition), the variance of the signal increases in φpi , in the limit φpi → ∞ the public signal’s
variance is still finite, hence δˆ 6= 1 . This implies that a policy infinitely aggressive on inflation
cannot serve as a commitment device against monetary policy shocks.
6.2.1 Optimal monetary policies
In this section I design targets for forward-looking interest-rate rules which restore the complete
information equilibrium for any choice of policy parameters (φpi , φy) . I start with the baseline case
of rule 2 and subsequently deal with the general form that equilibria can have when a forward-
looking policy is followed, given by (30) - (33) .
Baseline equilibrium. I will follow a reverse engineering process. The optimal policy suggested
above requires setting φpi = 0 . It is straightforward to check that this implies yt = at and pt = −at
(see also fn. 58 below) .
Consider the rule
it = − log β + φpi Emt [pit+1 − pˆit+1] + φy Emt ∆[yt+1 − yˆt+1] , (75)
where the target levels of prices and output are set equal to their above specified levels: pˆit+1 =
−Emt [∆at+1] and yˆt = at . This rule involves the monetary authority “punishing” deviations from
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the efficient inflation and growth rates.56,57
Taking the same steps as in the derivations of (36) - (37) shows that any chosen coefficients
(φpi , φy) can drive the economy to its efficient level. The Friedman rule is a special case obtained
for φpi = φy = 0 .
Multiple equilibria. Consider the interest-rate rule given by (75) . Make the following modifi-
cation:
pˆit+1 = κ7E
m
t [∆at+1] (76)
κ7 = − 1 + φpi − 1
φpi
k (1− θ)κ5 . (77)
This rule drives the economy to its complete information counterpart. Once again, observe that
the inflation and growth targets are related to their complete information levels.58 The proposed
rule is invariant to changes in φy , whereas, as (77) shows, it adjusts to the chosen value of φpi .
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To get an intuition for the latter, first use the former result and set φy = 0 in order to bring the
equilibrium closer to the equilibrium given by (34) - (35) . Then observe in (34) that the real effects
of the consumer’s expectations depend on the monetary authority’s response to expected inflation,
φpi . Hence, the targets in the suggested policy (75) - (77) also need to adjust accordingly to changes
in φpi . All derivations are collected in Appendix A.5 .
The monetary authority can extract the role of the consumer’s expectations, parametrized by κ5 ,
and productivity at by observing output and prices (see also (35)) when it steps in; subsequently, it
56 As already emphasized, the authority has complete information when it sets the nominal interest rate.
57Orphanides (2003) discusses the benefits of targeting output growth.
58 To get an intuition for this, recall that the efficient equilibrium requires ξ3 = 0 ; this implies κ4 = 0 by (32)
and κ6 =
1
φpi−1 by (33) . Given these, we can see in (34) that ξ3 = 0 prevails for φpi such that κ5 = − 1k (1−θ)
φpi
φpi−1 .
Then, the equilibrium is
yt = at (78)
pt =
1
φpi − 1 at −
1
k (1− θ)
φpi
φpi − 1 E
c
t [xt] . (79)
The rule given by (75) - (77) and yˆt = at yields
yt = at (80)
pt = − [1 + k (1− θ)κ5] at + κ5Ect [xt] . (81)
Setting κ5 = − 1k (1−θ) φpiφpi−1 returns (78) - (79) .
59The rule will not adjust to changes in φpi for κ5 = 0 , as already shown.
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can invoke the rule given by (75) - (77) and yˆt = at and restore the complete information equilibrium
for any choice of policy parameters (φpi , φy) .
Last, observe that setting κ5 = 0 returns κ6 = −1 and κ7 = −1 , which correspond to the
baseline rule (75) .
7 Conclusion
This paper has reconsidered the nature of purely expectational shocks within a competitive, cash-
less, monetary economy. Asymmetric information about current fundamentals is the driving force
in the model. Informational asymmetries lead agents to form heterogeneous expectations about in-
flation; as a result, monetary policy and consumers’ expectations have real effects through inflation.
Traditionally, expectational shocks are viewed as Keynesian demand shocks: when positive, they
increase output, employment and inflation. I have shown that this interpretation remains a possi-
bility but is not the only one; expectational shocks can cause business cycle patterns associated with
supply shocks: when positive, they increase output and employment and they lower inflation. Such
an interpretation seems in line with the low inflation and the high cyclical employment in the mid-
80s and the second half of the 90s, which are recalled as periods of exuberant optimism. Whether
expectational shocks manifest themselves as demand or supply shocks reflects the monetary policy
pursued.
I have considered different interest-rate rules and shown that forward-looking rules generate
multiple equilibria in which consumers’ expectations have an arbitrary role. Further to this, expec-
tational shocks cause substantially higher short-run output volatility under forward-looking policies
than under “contemporaneous” ones. Inflation stabilization per se is typically suboptimal, as it can
at best eliminate uncertainty arising through prices. Optimal monetary policies manipulate inflation
so that the producer correctly anticipates his revenue. In this way, producers’ incomplete informa-
tion about productivity becomes irrelevant. I have designed targets for forward-looking interest-rate
rules which restore the complete information equilibrium for any chosen policy parameters.
Recovering purely expectational shocks from the data will shed light on their seemingly shifting
nature. Of course, the literature on the identification of expectational shocks remains far from
settled (for example, Beaudry and Portier (2006), Blanchard et al. (2009) and Barsky and Sims
(2011a,b)). On the policy front, introducing capital, investment and credit constraints is a rather
natural extension with potentially promising monetary policy implications.
36
A Omitted derivations
A.1 Equilibrium definition and agents’ problems
Equilibrium definition. A rational expectations equilibrium under an interest-rate rule Q (Ψt)
consists of prices {Pt (Ψt) , Wt (Ψt \{at})} , an allocation {Ndt (Ψt \{at}) , Yt (Ψt)} for the producer
and an allocation {Ct (Ψt) , N st (Ψt) , Bt+1 (Ψt)} for the consumer such that:
1. {Ndt (Ψt \ {at}) , Yt (Ψt)} solves the producer’s problem, laid out below, at prices {Pt (Ψt) ,
Wt (Ψt \ {at}) , Q (Ψt)} .
2. {Ct (Ψt) , N st (Ψt) , Bt+1 (Ψt)} solves the consumer’s problem, laid out below, at prices {Pt (Ψt) ,
Wt (Ψt \ {at}) , Q (Ψt)} .
3. All markets clear: Yt = Ct, N
d
t = N
s
t , Bt+1 = 0 for all t with B0 = 0 .
Producer’s problem. Stage 2 profits of the consumer-owned firm are given by Πt = Pt Yt −
WtNt , where Yt = AtNt .
In stage 1 of each period t , the producer chooses Nt ≥ 0 to maximize the firm’s expected profits
evaluated according to the consumer’s Lagrange multiplier denoted λt :
Ept [λt Πt] .
Expectations are with respect to the information set of the producer in stage 1 which, as specified
in the main text, is Ipt,1 = Ψt \ {at} . The maximization problem does not yield a solution for
Wt <
Ept [λt Pt At]
Ept [λt]
.
The producer accommodates any labor supply for
Wt =
Ept [λt PtAt]
Ept [λt]
. (82)
Since, technology is linear in the worker’s productivity, the scale of production is pinned down by
the labor supply side. Put differently, the producer commits to accommodate any labor supplied
which will pin down the output produced as long as the nominal wage is the one given by (82) .
The case in which the LHS of (82) is greater than the RHS implies Nt = 0 which in turn implies
Yt = 0 , which is not possible in equilibrium as the consumer’s problem requires Ct > 0 .
On another note, since production takes place after the nominal wage is announced and depends
on the consumer/worker’s productivity, Yt in the definition of equilibrium above is a function of the
state Ψt rather than the producer’s information set in stage 1 , Ψt \ {at} .
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Consumer’s problem. Given B0 = 0, the consumer solves the following problem:
max
{Ct , Nt , Bt+1}∞t=0
Ec0
∞∑
t=0
(
logCt − N
1+ζ
t
1 + ζ
)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
PtCt + QtBt+1 = Bt + WtNt + Πt ,
and a no-Ponzi-scheme constraint (requiring that Bt+1 > −Γ for any Γ > 0 at all t would do since
in equilibrium Bt+1 = 0 for all t) . The FOCs with respect to Ct, Nt, and Bt+1 respectively are:
1
Ct
= λt Pt (83)
N ζt = λtWt (84)
Qt = β
Ect [λt+1]
λt
, (85)
where, as noted above, λt is the current-value Lagrange multiplier associated with the period-t
budget constraint. Expectations are with respect to the information set of the consumer which
coincides with the state Ψt (see also the analysis in the main text) . I have made no distinction
between stages 1 and 2 for the consumer as he has the same information in both stages. Combining
(83) with (84) and (83) with (85) yields, respectively,
N ζt =
Wt
PtCt
(86)
Qt = β E
c
t
[
Pt
Pt+1
Ct
Ct+1
]
. (87)
In addition, the no-Ponzi-scheme condition and the fact that nominal bonds are in zero net-supply
imply Bt+1 = 0 in equilibrium.
A.2 Kalman filter
Let me start with the consumer’s case which is easier to handle. The consumer’s information set
is Ict = I
c
t−1 ∪ {st, at} . Suppose the consumer’s prior in period t is xt | Ict−1 ∼ N(0 , σ˜2x) , where
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σ˜2x ≡ V arct−1 [xt] . Before applying Bayes’ Law, recall that all shocks are serially uncorrelated,
mutually independent, and normally distributed. The consumer’s posterior is
xt | Ict−1 ∼ N
(
0 ,
(
1
σ˜2x
+
1
σ2e
+
1
σ2u
)−1)
.
This implies the following period’s prior is
xt+1 | Ict ∼ N
(
0 ,
(
1
σ˜2x
+
1
σ2e
+
1
σ2u
)−1
+ σ2
)
.
Using σˆ2x to denote V ar
c
t [xt+1] , it follows that
σˆ2x =
(
1
σ˜2x
+
1
σ2e
+
1
σ2u
)−1
+ σ2 . (88)
I will assume the consumer’s prior in period 0 is x0 | −1 ∼ N(0 , σ2x) , where I let σ2x denote
the solution (a fixed point) to the Riccati equation (88) . This implies the learning problem of the
agents is at its steady state when time commences. Turning to the coefficients in (16) , let
k ≡
1
σ2e
+ 1
σ2u
1
σ2x
+ 1
σ2e
+ 1
σ2u
,
denote the Kalman gain term, that is the precision of new information relative to the prior’s pre-
cision. This is time-invariant due to the consumer’s learning problem being at its steady state. In
addition, let θ ≡
1
σ2e
1
σ2e
+ 1
σ2u
, denote the relative precision of the signal st within the new information
{st, at} .
Turning to the producer’s learning problem, recall from the analysis in the main text that agents
have the same information set at the end of each period, that is Ipt−1,2 = I
c
t−1 . As as result, they
have the same prior in the following period. However, their information sets differ in stage 1 . In
particular, the producer’s information set is Ipt,1 = I
p
t−1,2 ∪ {st} . Letting µ ≡
1
σ2e
1
σ2x
+ 1
σ2e
yields the
coefficient in (15) .
A thorough demonstration of the Kalman filter can be found in Anderson and Moore (1979),
Harvey (1989) and Technical Appendix B in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) .
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A.3 Equilibrium under Rule 1
Let me elaborate first on the filtering problems of the agents. The producer’s and the consumer’s
expectations, respectively, are (see also (15) and (16)) :
Ept [at] = E
p
t,1 [xt] = (1− µ)Ept−1,2 [xt−1] + µ st
Ept,2 [xt] = E
c
t [xt] = (1− k)Ect−1 [xt−1] + k [θ st + (1− θ) at] .
Then, the consumer’s expectations in period t of the producer’s expectations in t+ 1 are given by
Ect [E
p
t+1 [at+1] ] = E
c
t [xt] , (89)
and the producer’s expectations in period t of the consumer’s expectations in t are given by
Ept [E
c
t [xt] ] = (1−k)Ect−1 [xt−1] + k [θ st + (1−θ)Ept [at]] = Ect [xt] + k (1−θ) (Ept [at]− at) . (90)
Substituting conjectures (C1), (C2), and (90) in (17) implies
ζnt = (1 + κ3 − ξ1)Ept [at] + κ2 k (1− θ) (Ept [at] − at) − (κ3 + ξ2) at . (91)
Substituting (91) in the firm’s technology, yt = at + nt , using market clearing, yt = ct , and,
subsequently, matching coefficients with conjecture (C1) yields
ξ1 =
1 + κ3 + κ2 k (1− θ)
1 + ζ
(92)
ξ2 =
ζ − κ3 − κ2 k (1− θ)
1 + ζ
. (93)
Observe that
ξ1 + ξ2 = 1 , (94)
a direct consequence of preferences logarithmic in consumption.
Turning to the Euler equation (18), conjectures (C1) and (C2) combined with (89) imply
Ect [ct+1] − ct = − ξ1Ept [at] + (ξ1 + ξ2)Ect [xt] − ξ2 at (95)
it − Ect [pit+1] = (φy ξ1 + φpi κ1)Ept [at] + [−κ1 + (φpi − 1)κ2 − κ3]Ect [xt] + [φy ξ2 + φpi κ3 − φy] at .
(96)
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Matching coefficients in (95) and (96) yields
− ξ1 =φy ξ1 + φpi κ1 (97)
ξ1 + ξ2 = − κ1 + (φpi − 1)κ2 − κ3 (98)
− ξ2 =φy ξ2 + φpi κ3 − φy . (99)
Summing (97) - (99) across sides and using (94) yields
κ1 + κ2 + κ3 = 0 , (100)
whereas summing across (97) and (99) and again using (94) yields
κ1 + κ3 = − 1
φpi
, (101)
which are equations (23) and (24) , respectively, in the main text.
Solving (93), (94) and (97) - (99) for ξ1 , ξ2 , κ1 , κ2 , κ3 returns (19) - (21) in the main text.
A.4 Equilibria under Rule 2
Equations (30) - (31) can be obtained by combining the equilibrium labor decision (14) with the
firm’s technology and market clearing. They coincide with (92) - (94), derived in Appendix A.3
above (one only needs to replace ξ1 with ξ3 , ξ2 with ξ4 , κ2 with κ5 , and κ3 with κ6) .
Turning to the Euler equation, conjectures (C3) - (C4) imply Ect [ct+1] = (ξ3 + ξ4)E
c
t [xt] and
Ect [pt+1] = (κ4 + κ5 + κ6)E
c
t [xt]. Then the LHS and the RHS of the Euler equation (13) after
taking into account that Imt = I
c
t (equation (29) in the main text) become, respectively,
Ect [ct+1] − ct = (ξ3 + ξ4)Ect [xt] − ξ3Ept [at] − ξ4 at (102)
it − Ect [pit+1] = (φpi − 1)Ect [pit+1] = (φpi − 1) [(κ4 + κ6)Ect [xt] − κ4Ept [at] − κ6 at] . (103)
Matching coefficients in (102) - (103) and using (31) yields (32) - (33) .
A.4.1 Omitted derivations in Section 5.5
First, I deal with the case in which the monetary authority reports the following period’s prices
with a measurement error. Next, I follow the same process in the case of a monetary policy shock.
Recall that what distinguishes the two cases is the information set of the monetary authority.
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Measurement error. Suppose at the end of period t − 1 the nominal interest rate serves as a
noisy signal about the price in t, as in (61) . Agents extract
p˜t = pt + wt , (104)
where p˜t ≡ it−1+φpi pt−1φpi . The monetary authority’s information set is Imt−1 = Ωt \ {zt} , where zt is
the public signal about period-t productivity which I derive below and Ωt denotes the state of the
economy in t . The latter is Ωt =
({aτ}tτ=0 , {sτ}tτ=0 , zt) . Using (37), (104) becomes
p˜t − κ4Ept [at | Ipt,1 \ {zt}]
κ6
= at +
1
κ6
wt , (105)
where κ4, κ6 are coefficients given by (30) - (33) for κ5 = 0 . The producer’s information set in
stage 1 is Ipt,1 = Ωt \{at} . The LHS in (105) is the endogenous public signal in stage 1 of t denoted
by zt . It follows then that
zt ≡
[φpi + ζ (φpi − 1)] p˜t − φpiφpi−1 E
p
t [at | Ipt,1 \ {zt}]
ζ
= at +
φpi + ζ (φpi − 1)
ζ
wt . (106)
The conditional variance of productivity is then σ2z ≡ V ar [at | zt] =
(
φpi + ζ (φpi−1)
ζ
)2
σ2w .
Turning back to the producer, suppose for a moment that zt is not part of his information set.
Then, the producer’s posterior distribution of at is
at | Ipt \ {zt} ∼ N
(
Ept
[
xt | Ipt,1 \ {zt}
]
, σ2x + σ
2
u
)
,
where Ept
[
xt | Ipt,1 \ {zt}
]
is given by (15) and σ2x is the fixed point in (88) . Taking zt into account,
the producer’s posterior becomes
at | Ipt,1 ∼ N
(
δ Ept
[
xt | Ipt,1 \ {zt}
]
+ (1− δ) zt , σ2a
)
, (107)
where δ =
(
1
σ2x+σ
2
u
)
/
(
1
σ2x+σ
2
u
+ 1
σ2z
)
and σ2a =
(
1
σ2x+σ
2
u
+ 1
σ2z
)−1
.
Monetary policy shock. In case the monetary authority transmits monetary policy shocks, its
information set additionally includes zˆt , that is I
m
t−1 = Ωˆt . Taking the same steps as before, agents
observe pˆt = φpi pt + ωt , where pˆt ≡ it−1 + φpi pt−1 . The monetary authority transmits the public
signal
zˆt = at +
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)
φpi ζ
ωt ,
where
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zˆt ≡
[φpi + ζ(φpi − 1)] pˆt − φ
2
pi
φpi−1 E
p
t [at | Ipt,1]
φpi ζ
. (108)
The conditional variance of productivity is σ2zˆ ≡ V ar[at | zˆt] =
(
φpi + ζ(φpi−1)
φpi ζ
)2
σ2ω . The producer’s
posterior is
at | Ipt,1 ∼ N
(
δˆ Ept
[
xt | Ipt,1 \ {zˆt}
]
+ (1− δˆ) zˆt , σ2aˆ
)
, (109)
where δˆ =
(
1
σ2x+σ
2
u
)
/
(
1
σ2x+σ
2
u
+ 1
σ2zˆ
)
and σ2aˆ =
(
1
σ2x+σ
2
u
+ 1
σ2zˆ
)−1
.
Observe that unlike in (106) , the producer’s expectations in (108) are conditional on the entire
information set of the producer. To fully extract zˆt use (109) to get
zˆt ≡ φpi − 1
φpi
pˆt − φpi
φpi + ζ(φpi − 1) δˆ E
p
t
[
xt | Ipt,1 \ {zˆt}
]
.
A.5 Derivations in Section 6.2
Consider the interest-rate rule
it = − log β + φpi Emt [pit+1 − pˆit+1] + φy Emt ∆[yt+1 − yˆt+1] ,
where pˆit+1 = κ7 (at+1 − at) and yˆt = at . A reverse engineering process will pin down κ7 .
The labor market optimality condition implies
ξ3 =
1 + κ6 + k (1− θ)κ5
1 + ζ
ξ4 = 1 − ξ3 ,
which correspond to equations (30) - (31) in the main text. Taking familiar steps, the Euler equation
implies
1− φy = (φpi − 1) (κ4 + κ6) − φpi κ7 − φy (110)
(1− φy) ξ3 = (φpi − 1)κ4 (111)
(1− φy) ξ4 = (φpi − 1)κ6 − φpi κ7 − φy . (112)
Setting
κ7 =
(φpi − 1)κ6 − 1
φpi
(113)
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implies ξ3 = 0 and ξ4 = 1 as required, κ4 = 0 and κ6 = − [1 + k (1 − θ)κ5] . Combining the
latter with (113) yields (77) in text.
B Data
Data in Figures 1 - 4 are collected from the St. Louis Fed and refer to the US economy for the
period 1965 : 1 - 2010 : 1 . Data in Figures 1 and 3 are quarterly, whereas in Figures 2 and 4 they are
annual. Employment refers to “All Employees: Total Nonfarm Employees (Thousands of Persons)”
(series PAYEMS) and is seasonally adjusted. It is logged and HP-filtered with penalty 1600 for
quarterly and 100 for annual data, respectively. Figures 1 - 4 show its cyclical component scaled
up by 50 for expositional clarity. Inflation in Figures 1 and 3 refers to percent changes in the
“Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator” (series GDPDEF) and is seasonally adjusted.
Inflation in Figures 2 and 4 refers to percent changes in the “Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers: All Items” (series CPIAUCSL) and is seasonally adjusted. Consumer Sentiment refers
to “University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment” (series UMCSENT1, UMCSENT) and is not
seasonally adjusted. It is scaled down by 25 in Figure 3 and by 10 in Figure 4 .
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Figure 1: Changes in GDP Deflator and Cyclical Employment: 1965 - 2010 (quarterly)
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Figure 2: CPI Inflation and Cyclical Employment: 1965 - 2010 (annual)
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Figure 3: Changes in GDP Deflator, Cyclical Employment and Consumer Sentiment: 1965 - 2010
(quarterly)
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Figure 4: CPI Inflation, Cyclical Employment and Consumer Sentiment: 1965 - 2010 (annual)
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a positive expectational shock for rule 1 with φy = 0.5
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for rule 1 with φy = 0.5
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a positive temporary productivity shock for rule 1 with φy = 0.5
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a positive expectational shock for rule 1 with φy = 0
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for rule 1 with φy = 0
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to a positive temporary productivity shock for rule 1 with φy = 0
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to a positive expectational shock for baseline rule 2 (1)
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Figure 12: Impulse responses to a positive expectational shock for baseline rule 2 (2)
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Figure 13: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for baseline rule 2 (1)
0 5 10 15
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x 10-3 Producer Expectations
0 5 10 15
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x 10-3 Output
0 5 10 15
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
x 10-3 Hours
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
x 10-3 Labor Wedge
61
Figure 14: Impulse responses to a positive permanent productivity shock for baseline rule 2 (2)
0 5 10 15
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Price Levels
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
x 10-3 Inflation
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
x 10-3 Consumer Expectations
0 5 10 15
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
x 10-3 Expected Inflation
0 5 10 15
-3
-2
-1
0
x 10-3 Nominal Interest Rate
0 5 10 15
-1
-0.5
0
x 10-3 Real Interest Rate
62
Figure 15: Impulse responses to a positive temporary productivity shock for baseline rule 2 (1)
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Figure 16: Impulse responses to a positive temporary productivity shock for baseline rule 2 (2)
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